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Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which a party wishes to commit a
secret bit to another party. Perfect security between mistrustful parties is unfortunately impossible
to achieve through the asynchronous exchange of classical and quantum messages. Perfect security
can nonetheless be achieved if each party splits into two agents exchanging classical information
at times and locations satisfying strict relativistic constraints. A relativistic multi-round protocol
to achieve this was previously proposed and used to implement a 2 millisecond commitment time.
Much longer durations were initially thought to be insecure, but recent theoretical progress showed
that this is not so. In this letter, we report on the implementation of a 24-hour bit commitment
based on timed high-speed optical communication and fast data processing only, with all agents
located within the city of Geneva. This duration is more than six orders of magnitude longer than
before, and we argue that it could be extended to one year and allow much more flexibility on
the locations of the agents. Our implementation offers a practical and viable solution for use in
applications such as digital signatures, secure voting and honesty-preserving auctions.
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive in which
a party Alice commits a secret bit to another party Bob,
and later reveals it at a time of her choosing. A bit-
commitment protocol is secure against a cheating Alice
if it guarantees that she cannot reveal, without being
caught, another bit than the one she initially committed
to an honest Bob. The protocol is also secure against a
cheating Bob if it guarantees that no information about
the committed bit can be obtained before Alice reveals
her commitment. Perfectly secure bit commitment be-
tween two mistrustful parties is known to be impossible
through the asynchronous exchange of classical or quan-
tum messages [1–3]. Arbitrarily long commitments using
the exchange of quantum messages are possible if one
makes the assumption that any quantum storage used
by a dishonest party is bounded [4, 5] and noisy [6]. The
security is however dependant on the parameter of the
hardware (loss, detection noise, etc.)
Alternatively, a scheme in which each party is split
in two agents was shown to be secure against classi-
cal attacks under the assumption that no communica-
tion was possible between agents of the same party [7].
Relativistic constraints on the communications between
the different parties were suggested to enforce the no-
communication assumption [8], and a protocol using
classical and quantum communication was proposed [9].
This protocol was experimentally realised and shown to
be secure against classical and quantum attacks, even
in the presence of unavoidable experimental imperfec-
tions [10, 11]. These protocols are however limited to
a single round of communication and therefore to a com-
mitment of at most 21 ms if the agents are all located on
Earth.
To overcome this limitation, a new scheme using multi-
ple rounds of classical communication was proposed and
shown to be secure against classical attacks [12]. This
scheme can in principle allow an arbitrary long commit-
ment time by periodically sustaining the carefully timed
classical communication between the two parties. The
security analysis in Ref. [12] derives the following bound
on the probability ǫ of a successful cheating attempt:
ǫ . 2−n/2
(m−1)
, (1)
where n is the length of the bit string communicated
between the agents of Bob and Alice at each round of
the protocol, and m+1 is the number of rounds [12]. To
keep ǫ ≪ 1, the length of the messages n has to grow
exponentially with the number of rounds. Therefore, an
arbitrarily long commitment is in practice impossible to
achieve. The implementation in Ref. [12] was limited
to 6 rounds, yielding a 2 ms bit-commitment with agents
separated by 131 km, i.e. between Geneva and Bern. This
could have been extended to a maximal value of 212 ms
using antipodal locations on earth.
Interestingly, the security bound of [12] was later im-
proved significantly in two independent proofs consider-
ing classical attacks [13, 14]. In both cases, the bound is
linear in the number of rounds. For instance, the bound
in [13] is
ǫ ≤ m 2(−n+3)/2. (2)
These results open the way towards the implementation
of much longer commitments. A more recent bound has
been derived [15] showing a small reduction of the re-
quired resources.
In this Letter, we present the first experimental real-
isation of a 24-hour long bit commitment using agents
suitably positioned 7 km apart, all within the immediate
vicinity of Geneva. This increases the previous commit-
ment time by more than six orders of magnitude com-
pared to what was achieved previously using relativistic
protocols [10, 12].
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FIG. 1. (a) Positioning of the agents of Bob and Alice. Agent
Bi imposes that Ai is within a distance li from him and that
she answers within a time τi. (b) Space-time diagram of the
multi-round protocol showing the relativistic constraints for
the spatial configuration where Ai is placed at the distance
limit li.
We first describe the multi-round protocol and its secu-
rity. The protocol contains a commit, sustain and reveal
phases. In the commit phase, the first agent of Bob B1
sends a random n-bit string x1 to the first agent of Alice
A1, who replies with the string y1 = a1 to commit the
bit 0, or y1 = x1 ⊕ a1 to commit the bit 1. Here, ”⊕” is
the bitwise XOR operation. The second agent B2 starts
the sustain phase by sending x2 to agent A2, who then
returns y2 = (x2 ·a1)⊕a2, where ”·” is the multiplication
in the Galois field F2n . The third round is again between
B1 and A1, the fourth one between B2 and A2, and so on.
At the kth round, the agent Bi sends xk and Ai replies
yk = (xk · ak−1) ⊕ ak, for 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Finally, to open
the commitment, the following Ai sends her commitment
and ym+1 = am to the corresponding Bi. With the set
of questions xi, the set of answers yi and the last string
am, Bob can compute all the previous ak and verify that
the bit he received during the reveal phase is the one
committed by the first answer y1 of agent A1.
To comply with the relativistic constraints, Alice
places one agent Ai near each agent of Bob Bi. The
distance L between the agents of Bob is chosen such that
by carefully timing the communication between Ai and
Bi, the security can be guaranteed. For our analysis,
we consider a situation where Alice is allowed to place
her agent Ai at a maximum distance li from their cor-
responding Bi, as shown in Fig. 1(a). To ensure that
no communication is possible between the two agents of
Alice, we must impose the two following constraints: Ai
should answer before a time τi from the start of the cor-
responding round, or the protocol is aborted, and agent
Bi should start the round tL − (τi + tM ) time after the
start of the previous round, where tL is the time taken
by light to travel the distance L and tM is a chosen time
margin. The security is guaranteed if tM is much greater
than the timing uncertainties. Fig. 1(b) shows the rela-
tivistic constraints in the case where the agents of Alice
are placed at the maximum allowed distance li. An agent
with a realistic data processing speed will have to place
himself closer to answer within τi. The time between the
rounds of each agent of Bob, labelled tQ, is related to tL,
tM and τi as tQ = 2tL − 2tM − (τ1 + τ2). In terms of the
distance parameters, this relation becomes:
tQ =
2
c
(L− (l1 + l2))− 2tM . (3)
The number of rounds is set by the spatial configuration,
the chosen time margin tM and the time of commitment
T . It can be related to tQ as:
m+ 1 =
2T
tQ
(4)
We now describe the implementation of the multi-
round relativistic protocol. Each agent has a computer
(Intel core i3 processor with 4 GB RAM) with a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) card (Xilinx SP605
evaluation board featuring Spartan-6 XC6SLX45T) in-
stalled to perform the computing tasks of the multi-round
protocol. To ensure an accurate timing of exchange be-
tween Ai and Bi, the FPGAs of Bob’s agents are synchro-
nized using local clocks. Specifically, each Bi has access
to an oven-controlled crystal oscillator (OCXO) with a
nominal frequency of 10 MHz. This frequency is then
multiplied inside the FPGA with a phase-locked loop to
obtain a 125-MHz reference used to clock the computa-
tions steps. The OCXO are disciplined by a Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) receiver, which provides a 1-PPS
(one pulse per second) signal aligned to the Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC). To make sure the FPGAs stay
synchronized with the GPS reference, the 1-PPS signal
from the receiver is also sent directly to the FPGA. An er-
ror of ±1 FPGA cycle (8 ns) on the expected 125×106 cy-
cles per second between two consecutive pulses from the
GPS is tolerated. This uncertainty is sufficiently small
to ensure that the relativistic constraints are satisfied.
The agents A1 and B1 are located at the Group of Ap-
plied Physics (GAP) of the University of Geneva, while
3agents A2 and B2 are placed 7.0 km away from the GAP.
An optical signal in straight line would take 23.3 µs to
cover this distance. Before starting the protocol, the
agents of Alice, and similarly the agents of Bob, share the
appropriate size of random data to generate the strings xi
and ai. The strings to be communicated are transferred
from the hard drive to the FPGA using a PCIe Gen1 x1
link. The maximum data transfer rate we can achieve
with this system is 200 mega bytes per seconds (MBps).
The exchange of the n-bit strings between Ai and Bi is
performed via a 1 m optical link. We set the length of
the strings to n = 128 bits. With the various latencies
in our system and the time needed to compute yk, we
can complete a round in 1.8 µs. To account for possible
fluctuations in the duration and timing of the rounds, we
impose that the agents of Alice answer within 3 µs from
the start of the round and take a margin tM of 3.3 µs,
such that each round starts 6.3 µs before the earliest ar-
rival time tL of the information from the previous round.
Fixing τ1 = τ2 = τ = 3 µs corresponds to a situation
where Bob imposes a maximum distance l1 = l2 = l of
450 m to the agents of Alice. The shortest distance L we
could achieve with our system is limited by τ and tM to
about 2.8 km.
We performed a 24-hour bit commitment with a secu-
rity parameter ǫ of 7.8 × 10−10, which requires 5 × 109
rounds, a total of 162 GB of data and an average transfer
rate of 0.5 MBps. The amount of time needed to verify
the commitment with the CPU of the computer is partic-
ularly long due to the computation of the Galois function.
In our case, the computing was performed on a standard
computer and took 72 hours, which is three times the
commitment time T . This issue can be solved by using
an FPGA to do the computing. We estimate that the
verification time of our experiment could be lowered to
about 90 minutes with a dedicated FPGA. Moreover, to
shorten this time Bob could start the calculation for both
bits in parallel of the bit commitment process and check
at the end when Alice reveal the bit value.
The protocol could in practice be achieved in a large
range of spatial configurations. Table 1 shows the re-
L [km] T ǫ r [ Bps] Data [GB] Tv
1 7.0 24 h 7.8× 10−10 5× 105 162 1 h 26 min
1 y 2.8 × 10−7 5× 105 59362 530 h
2 10000 24 h 1× 10−12 649 0.2 7 s
1 y 3.9× 10−10 649 81 44 min
TABLE I. Table showing the security parameter ǫ, the data
transfer rate r, the amount of data and the estimated veri-
fication time Tv achievable with an FPGA for two different
cases of spatial configurations and commitment times (24 h
and 1 year). Case 1: τ = 3 µs, l = 450 m and tM = 3.3 µs;
Case 2: τ = 20 ms, l = 3000 km and tM = 1 ms . The length
of the communicated string is set to 128 bits in both cases.
quired resources and the security parameter for two dif-
ferent spatial configurations and commitment times. The
case 1 corresponds to our experiment, i.e. Bob’s agents
located seven kilometres apart and Alice’s agents placed
near the agents of Bob. Bit commitments in this regime
are the most demanding in terms of resources. Increas-
ing the distance between the agents of Bob effectively re-
duces the number of rounds, hence reduces the resources
needed. The case 2 corresponds to a situation where the
agents of Bob are separated by a straight line distance
of 10,000 km and impose that the agents of Alice an-
swer within 20 ms from the beginning of the rounds. In
20 ms, light covers a straight line distance of 6000 km.
This means that Alice must position her agents within a
3000 km radius from Bob’s agents. In practice, this ra-
dius will be smaller, depending on the speed and latency
of the communication link between the agents. As an
example, Bob could have one agent in the center of the
United States of America and one agent in the center of
China, and could engage the commitment with agents of
Alice located within a large area of these two countries.
Indeed, we can imagine networks formed by several in-
terconnected nodes allowing commitments from parties
placed all over the world.
The security against a cheating Alice relies on the cor-
rect timing of each round with respect to the previous
one. In order to exclude attacks on the timing, such as
spoofing of the GPS signal, Bob could rely solely on local
clocks, provided they have been synchronized before, e.g.
with a third clock travelling between the agents. For a
margin of 1 ms (case 2), the uncertainty on the frequency
of the clocks must be less than 1.2× 10−8 for a commit-
ment time of 24 hours and less than 3.1 × 10−11 for a
commitment time of 1 year, which can be achieved with
commercially available clocks[16].
Our implementation demonstrates long commitment
times without the need of large computing power in re-
alistic and potentially useful scenarios. The implemen-
tation offers a practical and viable solution for use in
applications such as coin tossing [17], zero-knowledge
proofs [18], digital signature [19] and secure multi-party
computations, including secure voting[20] and honesty-
preserving auctions [19].
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